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Abstract 
 
It is very important for service industries to decentralize consumers at peak time, and thereby  
to increase sales not at peak time. This study discusses an optimal number of business hours 
for a service industry when the service provider offers a price discount immediately after  
the opening time and just before the closing time.  For a specific ideal service time distri- 
bution of consumers, the optimal opening and closing time are explored.  Clarified are the  
conditions under which an optimal number of business hours exists to maximize the social  
welfare. Numerical examples are also presented to illustrate the theoretical underpinnings of  
the proposed model.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The regulations of business hours have traditionally generated a central issue in many European 
countries (see, e.g., De Meza(1984), Ferris(1990, 1991), Clemenz(1990, 1994), Inderst and Irmen (2
005)). In the real world, however, it is very important for service providers to decentralize con-
sumers at peak time and increase the sales not at peak time to increase the sales and/or the profit.  
Shy and Stenbacka(2006) have proposed a model to discuss an optimal number of business 
hours for a service provider against a specific consumers’ ideal service time distribution.  
In the real circumstance, it can observed that a special offer such as time discount has com-
monly implemented by service providers as an effective strategy, e.g., morning perm at a beauty 
salon, happy hour at a hotel, midnight discount of a telecommunications industry, special time 
discount in business logistics and so forth. From this point of view, Kim and Sandoh(2014) have 
introduced a special offer of discount of price immediately after the opening time and just be-
fore the closing time to discuss an optimal number of business hours, where the service provider 
is interested in maximizing his profit. This type of price promotion is an effective management 
tool since a service provider can attract extra consumers whose ideal or convenient service times 
are before the opening time or after the closing time.  
In this study, we focus on the social welfare as an objective function to be maximized and 
clarify the conditions where an optimal number of business hours exists. Numerical examples 
are also presented to illustrate the insights of our analysis.  
 
2. Model Formulation 
 
2.1 Assumptions and notations   
The assumptions along with their relevant notations in this study are as follows: 
(1) Each individual consumer has her own ideal time to visit the provider to receive service fro
m the service provider. 
(2) Each consumer obtains utility, 0u , by purchasing a service product. 
(3) The regular selling price of a service product is p . 
(4) During the price discount period, the provider sells his service product at price pα  as 
his special offer, where 10 << α . 
(5) The length of the price discount period is denoted by ( 0)τ > . 
(6) A consumer owes ω  per unit of time to shift her actual service time from her own 
ideal service time to purchase a service product.  
(7) The opening and closing times are, respectively, denoted by ot  and ct , where we have 
.10 ≤≤≤ co tt  
(8) The raw price per service product is given by 𝑐𝑐1, while the operation cost of the service 
provider per unit of time is 𝑐𝑐2. 
 
2.2 Ideal service time distribution  
In this study, we assume that a customer distribution 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 in which the number of consumers 
with an ideal service time t ( )10 ≤≤ t  is  
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where n  represents the population size and µ ( )10 ≤≤ µ  measures the degree of uniformity. 
Figure 1 shows the ideal time distribution given by Eq. (2.1) for n =1 against various values of 
µ . 
  Shy and Stenbacka[6] have assumed the above ideal time distribution on the unit circle with 
the view to formalizing the idea that there are spillovers between time periods. In this study, 
however, we assume the same structure of the ideal time distribution on the unit time interval [0, 
1]. This is because spillovers are an important factor only when the service provider sells his 
products for almost whole unit time period, and in such a situation the strategic determination of 
service hours might not be necessary. 
  We here introduce and additional assumption as follows: 
(9) When the selling price is discounted to pα  at t, demand quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 increases ( ) tqβ α  
to [ ]1 ( ) tqβ α+  for ( ) 0β α >   and 10 << α . 
 
 
Figure 1: Ideal time distribution(n=1). 
 
  In the above, Assumption (9) signifies the price elasticity η  of demand is given by 
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p
β α
β αη α
α α
= − = < <
− −
 
 
where lim∝→1−0 𝛽𝛽(𝛼𝛼) = 0.  
  In the following, consumers involved in and represented by the demand quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡  are
called type A , while those expressed by tq)(αβ  are referred to type B.  Moreover, we con-
centrate upon the case where values of α  and )(αβ  are both specified to specific values, 
and therefore )(αβ  is written as β  for simplicity. 
 
3.  Consumers’ Behavior 
 
3.1 Best response    
Since the ideal time distribution by Eq. (2.1) reveals a symmetrical shape, the opening time, 
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ot , and the closing time, ct , are also symmetrical with respect to 1
2
t = , accordingly we have 
 
ct = 1 - ot . 
 
Hence, we focus on the former half 
10,  
2
 
 
 of period to discuss the opening time, ot , here-
after. 
 
(1) Type A consumers’ response    
When the provider offers early birds specials and/or closing time discount/sale, the best re-
sponse of type A consumers with ideal time t  becomes as follows: 
 
i) If (1 )0,  ,aot t ∈    type A consumers are reluctant to wait until ot , and purchase no serv-
ice product, where 
 
      (1 ) 0 .                                                  (3.1)ao o
u pt t α
ω
−
= −   
 
Consequently, their net utility, tU , becomes  
 
0tU = . 
 
ii) If ( (1 ) ,  ao ot t t ∈  , type A consumers purchase a service product at the discounted price 
pα  by waiting until ot , and hence their net utility is given by 
 
0 ( )t oU u p t tα ω= − − − . 
 
iii) Type A consumers with their ideal time ( ],  o ot t t τ∈ +  purchase a service product 
at their own ideal time t ,  at the discounted price pα .  In this case, their net utili-
ty becomes 
 
0tU u pα= − . 
 
iv) In the case of ( (2),  o ot t tτ ∈ +  , the consumers purchase a service product earlier than
their own ideal time t , at the special price pα , yielding 
 
[ ]0 ( )t oU u p t tα ω τ= − − − + , 
where 
                       
(2) (1 ) .                                             (3.2)o o
pt t ατ
ω
−
= + +
 
 
It should be noted in Eq. (3.2) that (2) 0 o o
u pt t ατ
ω
−
≠ + +  since consumers with their 
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own ideal time t , can obtain positive utility, pu −0 , even at t , and (2)ot  should be
derived from the condition in reference to t ;  
 
( )0 0 .ou p t t u pα ω τ− − − + ≥ −    
 
v) When (2)
1,  ,
2o
t t ∈  
 type A consumers will purchase a service product at the regular
price, p, at their ideal time t , and hence  
 
0 .tU u p= −  
 
(2) Type B consumers’ response.   
The best response of type B consumers with their ideal time t is described as follows: 
i) If (1 )0,  ,bot t ∈    type B consumers would not wait until ot  because they purchase n
o service, where 
 
                          
(1 ) (1 ) .                                             (3.3)bo o
pt t α
ω
−
= −  
 
   Consequently, their net utility becomes 
 
0.tU =  
 
   ii) If ( (1 ) ,  bo ot t t ∈  , type B consumers purchases a service product at pα , by shifting  
their actual service time from their own ideal time to ot . In this case, the maxi- 
mum value of their net utility can be represented by 
 
(1 ) ( ).t oU p t tα ω= − − −  
 
   iii) Consumers with ( ],  o ot t t τ∈ +  purchase a service product at the discounted price 
pα , at their own ideal service time, and hence their maximum net utility can be ex-
pressed as 
 
(1 ) .tU pα= −  
 
   iv) In the case of ( (2),  o ot t tτ ∈ +  , type B consumers purchase a product earlier than  
their ideal time at pα , and their maximum net utility becomes 
 
[ ](1 ) ( ) .t oU p t tα ω τ= − − − +  
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v) (2)
1,  ,
2o
t t ∈  
 type B consumers would purchase no service product yielding 
 
0.tU =  
 
3.2  Domain of opening time   
It is neither reasonable nor proper for a consumer with ideal time t < 0 to shift her actual serv- 
ice time to ot , and thereby we assume 
 
( )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 0min ,  0,a b ao o o o u pt t t t αω
−
= = − ≥  
 
which constrains the opening time to satisfy 
 
                              0 (1 ) .                                                 (3.4)o
u pt α
ω
− −
≥
                         
 
 
The right-hand-side of Eq. (3.4) is denoted by Lt  in the following. 
Likewise, it is reasonable to assume 
 
,
2
1)2( ≤ot  
 
which is equivalent to 
 
                              1 (1 ) .                                              (3.5)
2o
pt ατ
ω
−
≤ − − .                        
 
The right-hand-side of Eq. (3.5) is denoted by Ut  hereafter. 
It should be noted here that Eqs. (3.4) and (3.5) yield, 
 
       
0 1 (1 ) , 
2
u p pα ατ
ω ω
− −
≤ − −
 
 
which signifies, at the same time, that ω  should satisfy 
 
                               
02[ (1 2 ) ]  .                                             (3.6)
1 2
u pα
ω
τ
+ −
≥
−    
 
From Eqs. (3.4) and (3.5),  the domain of to is, as a result, given by 
 
0 1 (1 ) .                         (3. 7)
2L o U
u p pt t tα ατ
ω ω
− −
≡ ≤ ≤ − − ≡
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4. Social Welfare  
4.1 Provider’s profit  
 
Let ( )1A oQ t  express the number of Type A consumers who purchase a service product at the 
discounted price pα ,  then we have 
 
( )
( 2)
(1 )1
0 0
2
(1 2 )             2 2(1 ) 2          (4.1)
o
a
o
t
o tA t
o
Q t q dt
u p u pn tατ µ µ τ
ω ω
=
+ −  −    = + × + − + −       
∫
                                            
 
 
By letting ( )1B oQ t  signfy the number of type B consumers who purchase a service product at 
pα ， we have  
      
( )
( 2)
(1 )1
2
2(1 ) 2(1 )             2 4 (1 )  (2 + ).           (4.2)
o
b
o
t
o tB t
o
Q t q dt
p pn n t
β
α αβµ τ β µ τ τ
ω ω
=
− −   = + + − +      
∫
 
 
On the other hand, let us denote, by ( )2 oQ t , the number of consumers who purchase a service 
product at the regular price p , then we have 
       
( 2)
1
2
2 ( ) 2
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )          2 2(1 ) .      (4.3)
2 2
o
o tt
o o
Q t q dt
p pn t tα ατ µ µ τ
ω ω
=
−  −    = − − − × + − + + +        
∫
 
 
Hence, the provider’s profit is given by 
 
     [ ]1 1 1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 2 ).    (4.4)        o A o B o o ot p c Q t Q t p c Q t c tαΠ = − + + − − −          
 
   We here introduce the following additional constraints so that the provider’s profit can take 
on a positive value at its demand peak and a negative value at its demand off-peak; 
 
                            1 2(2 )( ) ,                                               (4.5)n p c cµ− − >  
 
                            1 2( ) .                                                  (4.6)n p c cµ − <                            
 
Further, we also assume 
1 ,c pα≤  
 
not to lose profit by the special offer. This provides a lower bound for α  and consequently the 
domain of α  is given by 
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              1 1.                                                     (4.7)c
p
α< <
                           
 
 
4.2 Consumers’ surplus   
Let us denote by ( )i oC t  the total surplus of Type i (i =A, B) consumers, then we  
have   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )(1 )
( 2 )
0 1 0 2 2
               2 [ ( )] ,                                                               (4.8)
o
a
o
o
o
t
A o A o o o tt
t
o tt
C t u p Q t u p Q t t t q dt
t t q dt
τ
α ω
ω τ
+
= − + − − −
− − +
∫
∫
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( 2 )
(1 )11 2 2 [ ( )] .      (4.9)
o o
b
o o
t t
B o B o o t o tt t
C t pQ t t t q dt t t q dt
τ
α ω β ω τ β
+
= − − − − − +∫ ∫  
 
Hence, the whole consumers’ surplus, which is denoted by ( )oC t , is given by 
 
( ) ( ) ( ).                                                   (4.10)o A o B oC t C t C t= +  
 
4.3 Social welfare   
The social welfare is defined by the sum of the total consumers’ surplus and the provider’s 
profit, i.e., let ( )otΨ  denote the social welfare, then we have 
 
( ) ( )
[ ] ( )
[
0 1 1 2 1 1
1 2 2
( )
         ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
                       ( ) ( )] (1 2 ),                           (4.11)
o o o
A o o B o
o o o
t t C t
u c Q t Q t p c Q t
D t D t c t
Ψ = Π +
= − + + −
− + − −
 
 
where 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )
( 2 )
1
2
2 ,
2(1 ) .
o o
a b
o o
o
o
t t
o o t o tt t
t
o o tt
D t t t q dt t t q dt
D t t t q dt
τ
ω β
β ω τ
+
 = − + −  
= + − +  
∫ ∫
∫
 
 
5. Optimal Strategy 
This section seeks for the socially optimal opening time ot
∗ , which can provide an optimal 
closing time ct
∗  by the symmetric structure of the ideal time distribution.  Numerical examples 
are also presented to illustrate the proposed model formulation. 
 
5.1  Analysis    
From Eq. (4.11), we have 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 1
0 1 1
1 2
2
( ) ( )
                                                  2 .                 (5.1)
o A o o B o
o o o o
o o
o o
d t dQ t dQ t dQ t
u c p c
dt dt dt dt
dD t dD t
c
dt dt
Ψ  
= − + + − 
 
 
− + + 
           
 
 
Let us denote, by ( )otϕ , the right-hand-side of Eq. (5.1), and let a and b be defined by 
 
0 ,
(1 ) .
u pa
pb
α
ω
α
ω
−
≡
−
≡
 
 
Then, we have 
 
   
( ) ( )0 1 1
2 2 2
2
( ) ( ) 8 (1 ) 2 ( )8 (1 ) 2
           2 2(1 )( ) 4 (1 ) 2 ,                                           (5.2)
o ot u c n a t n p c n b
n a b b c
ϕ µ µ β µ τ
ω µ β µ
= − − − − + − − +  
 − − + + − + 
 
 
which indicates ( )otϕ  is strictly decreasing in ot . 
   In addition, we have 
 
( )0 0 1 1
2 2 2
2
2 ( ) ( )8 (1 ) 2
                         2 2(1 )( ) 4 (1 ) 2 ,                  (5.3)
u p n u c p c n b
n a b b c
αϕ µ β µ τ
ω
ω µ β µ
−  = − − + − − + 
 
 − − + + − + 
 
 
( ) ( )0 1
1
2 2 2
2
1 (1 ) 2 2(1 ) 2 2 2 1
2
                                    ( )8 (1 )( 2 )
                                    2 2(1 )( ) 4 (1 ) 2 .                  (5.4
p n u c b a
p c n b
n a b b c
αϕ τ µ τ µ
ω
β µ τ
ω µ β µ
− − − = − − + + − −     
+ − − +
 − − + + − +  )
  
  Now, let A and B be defined by 
 
         
( )0 1 1
2 2 2
2
( ) ( )4 (1 ) 2
        2(1 )( ) 4 (1 ) ,                              (5.5)
A n u c p c n b
n a b b c
µ β µ τ
ω µ β µ
≡ − − + − − +
 − − + + − + 
 
 
( ) ( )
( )
0 1
1
2 2 2
2
 2(1 ) 2 2 2 1
           ( )4 (1 )( 2 )
              2(1 ) 4 (1 ) ,                        (5.6) 
B n u c b a
p c n b
n a b b c
µ τ µ
β µ τ
ω µ β µ
≡ − − + + − −  
+ − − +
 − − + + − + 
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and then the optimal opening time, ot
∗ , can be discussed under the following classification: 
 
(a) If we have 0A > , further classification is necessary. 
 
i) In the case of 0B ≥ , ot
∗  is given by 
 
.
1 (1 )
2o U
pt tατ
ω
∗ −= − − =  
 
ii) On the contrary, in case we have 0B < , ot
∗  is given by 
 
( ) ( )2 2 21 2
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
( 2 )
.
4(1 )( ) 2( ) 4 (1 )( )o
a bp c b b ct a
u c u c u c u c n u c
ωβ τµ βω
µ µ
∗
+− +
= − + − − +
− − − − − − −
 
 
(b) If we have 0A ≤ , then ( ) 0otπ ≤  and hence 
 
   
0
.o L
u pt tα
ω
∗ −= =  
 
 As for the optimal opening time, ot
∗ , we have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1  For the ideal time distribution with 1µ = , if 20 1
cu c
n
− ≥ , the opening time
 becomes 
0
o L
u pt tα
ω
∗ −= = , 
 otherwise we have 
 1 (1 ) .
2o U
pt tατ
ω
∗ −= − − =  
 
Proof.   In the case of 1µ = , the relationship 20 1
cu c
n
− ≥  reveals 0A ≤  from Eq. (5.5) 
along with ( ) 0otϕ ≤ .  On the contrary, 20 1
cu c
n
− <  agrees with 0B > , accordingly we 
have ( ) 0.otϕ >  
 
5.2  Numerical examples   
This subsection presents numerical examples to illustrate the proposed model. Table 1 shows the
optimal opening time, ot
∗ , and its corresponding welfare, ( )ot
∗Ψ , together with Lt  and Ut
against various values of µ  and α  when we set the para-meters involved in the model  
as 0 1 2 ,( ,  , ,  , ,  , , )  (1,  0.05,  10,  9.49,  80  4.99,  2.29,  0.35)n u p c cτ ω β = . It is observed in Table 1 
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that the optimal opening time, ot
∗ , satisfies L o Ut t t
∗< <  in the case of 0.25.µ =  In the oth
er  
cases, we have .o Lt t
∗ =  Table 1 indicates that as the distribution becomes closer to uniform, 
service hours maximizing the social welfare would increase towards “open 24 hours”.  
 
   
Table 1:  Optimal strategies. 
µ    0.25     0.5     0.75   
α  0.75  0.8 0.85 0.75  0.8 0.85 0.75 0.8 0.85 
Lt  0.036 0.0301 0.0242 0.036 0.0301 0.0242 0.036 0.0301 0.0242 
Ut  0.4203 0.4263 0.4322 0.4203 0.4263 0.4322 0.4203 0.4263 0.4322 
ot
∗
 0.1171 0.1149 0.1111 0.036 0.0301 0.0242 0.036 0.0301 0.0242 
*( )otΨ  3.042 3.0358 3.0188 2.9641 2.957 2.9403 2.985 2.9864 2.9754 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the shape of the social welfare, ( )otΨ , for 50.0 ,25.0=µ  and 0.75 against 
0.8α =  with the other parameter values set to the same values in Table 1.  It is also observed
in Fig.1 that ( )otΨ  has apparently its maximum when 0.25µ = , while it is decreasing in 
ot  against 0.50,  0.75µ =  taking its maximum at 0.0301 .o Lt t
∗ = =    
 
Figure 2: Behavior of social welfare.  
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we discussed an optimal number of business hours for a service provider， 
where he offers a special discounted price immediately after opening the store and just 
before closing it. Under a specific ideal service time distribution of consumers, derived 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
μ=0.25 
μ=0.5 
μ=0.75 
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was the social welfare which is an objective function to be maximized. We clarified the
conditions under which there exists an optimal opening time along with an optimal clos-
ing one. It was also shown that the optimal opening time decreases with increasing uni-
formity of the ideal time distribution. Numerical examples were also presented to illus- 
trate the theoretical underpinnings of the proposed mathematical model.  
  The authors are to make a comparison between the results of this study and those in
Kim and Sandoh(2015), which will appear in the forthcoming paper.  
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